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Comment  Dae Il Kim
The authors of this chapter present quite important and interesting empiri-
cal ﬁ  ndings. The share of the elderly population negatively aﬀects the level 
of public educational expenditure in recent years in Japan, as was found 
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in the United States. This result deserves careful attention because many 
other countries are similarly experiencing population aging and also because 
high-  quality education has been increasingly emphasized in the face of 
rapid technological progress and increased world market competition. To 
the extent that the causality is robust, we will have to work hard to ﬁ  nd a 
way to deal with population aging without sacriﬁ  cing the quality of our 
education systems.
Given that the result has such a strong implication, the authors need to 
substantiate their interpretation with additional empirical evidence. The 
authors suggest several theories, but they are not quite successful in singling 
out the one behind the empirical ﬁ  ndings. They test the possibility that the 
elderly may have become more selﬁ  sh and short- sighted, and conclude oth-
erwise as the changes in living arrangement do not explain the results. The 
power of the test, however, does not appear suﬃciently strong for a couple 
of reasons. First, living arrangement itself may not be a valid indicator 
for how uninterested the elderly are in their children’s and grandchildren’s 
welfare in an Asian country such as Japan, where family values are strongly 
emphasized. At the same time, to the extent that intrafamily transfer is an 
important income source for the elderly, the elderly may not really ben-
eﬁ  t from being so selﬁ  sh as to place political pressure against educational 
expenditure. Greater subsidy for the elderly ﬁ  nanced by lower educational 
expenditure, for example, may induce a smaller intrafamily transfer, lead-
ing to no changes in their actual income. Indeed, public transfer crowds out 
private transfer (from their children) among the Korean elderly households 
almost one to one, and Japan may not be much diﬀerent from Korea in that 
aspect. Second, the regression with the changes in living arrangement as an 
additional explanatory variable serves only as an indirect test, and a more 
direct test would be investigating whether elderly population induces an 
increase in the public expenditure directly linked to the welfare of the elderly, 
such as income transfer and health care.
The authors speculate, in conclusion, that the changes in the subsidy from 
central government may have caused the negative eﬀects of the elderly popu-
lation on the educational expenditure. The possibility cannot be excluded, 
but two interrelated questions still remain. First, why would the eﬀect of 
the changes in subsidy from central government show up in the relation-
ship between the elderly population and the educational expenditure? I think 
it is possible that such changes aﬀect the educational expenditure at local 
governments, but how are they related to the size of the elderly population? 
Second, what is the mechanism through which the changes in subsidy system 
aﬀect the results? Little information is given regarding these two questions, 
and readers will love to see more information to better understand the chap-
ter. Further regarding the issue, the authors may wish to pay more attention 
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fell considerably from the previously stable trend. If the period stands out in 
terms of the correlation between the elderly population and the educational 
expenditure, the authors’ speculation can be more persuasive.
Now I turn to the choice of variables in the regression. In particular, the 
authors need to pay more attention to the OLD and KID variables in the 
regression. As suggested by the authors, a greater share of schoolkids in 
population tends to reduce the per-  student educational expenditure. But 
at the same time, a greater share of schoolkids implies a greater share of 
households with kids, whose parents may vote for a greater expenditure for 
education. These two eﬀects oﬀset each other, but the relative magnitudes 
of these eﬀects may also depend on population aging, to the extent the aging 
arises from a lower fertility rate. In other words, a decline in fertility rate may 
reduce the share of schoolkids in population, but not so much the fraction 
of the households with schoolkids. As only the share of schoolkids (KID) 
is controlled for in the regression, the eﬀects through the fraction of the 
households with schoolkids may show up in the coeﬃcients on the elderly 
population. If so, the educational expenditure is not adversely aﬀected 
by the increasing size of the elderly population. Instead, the educational 
expenditure is adversely aﬀected by the declining size of the fraction of 
the households with kids, which is represented as an increase of the elderly 
population in the data.
Another complication arises in the regression as the increase in the share 
of the elderly, given that the share of kids partly reﬂ  ects a smaller working-
  age population. To the extent that the smaller workforce means smaller 
tax revenue, the negative coeﬃcients on the elderly population may simply 
represent the local government’s ability to spend. The positive coeﬃcient on 
the per capita income is consistent with this alternative interpretation.
An alternative way to interpret the authors’ results is the nonlinearity 
in the relationship between political power and the population size. The 
median voter theory used by the authors actually suggests such nonlinearity. 
An increase in the elderly population will have a stronger eﬀect on public 
policy when their population is suﬃciently large that the elderly are near the 
median. Instead, when their population is too small or too large, an increase 
in their population will have no marginal eﬀect on the public policy. Thus the 
empirical results are consistent with the following interpretation. First, the 
elderly have always been selﬁ  sh. Second, their selﬁ  shness has ﬁ  nally started 
to aﬀect the public policies in the 1990s because the elderly population has 
suﬃciently grown. One way to consider this hypothesis is to compare the 
sizes of elderly population between Japan and the United States at the time 
when the relationship between the elderly population and the educational 
expenditure started to turn negative in each country.
Again, I wish to emphasize that the empirical relationship documented 
in this chapter is very important and deserves careful attention. I would like 222        Fumio Ohtake and Shinpei Sano
to thank the authors for providing the interesting results and also encour-
age further works on the issue. Identifying the causality and the underlying 
hypothesis will make a substantial contribution to the literature.
Comment  Chang- Gyun  Park
The chapter examines the relationship between demographic structure and 
government expenditure on compulsory public education with Japanese 
data. A standard theoretical model would predict that if the median voter 
is old enough to be without kids under compulsory public education and 
does not take the external eﬀect on general productivity level into account, 
we would observe the positive correlation between the two variables. Several 
researchers had already tackled the issue and provided evidence conform-
ing to the implication of generational competition theory. However, Japan 
seems to be an ideal test site to reexamine the issue because it has experienced 
one of the fastest demographic changes in human history.
The authors report an interesting ﬁ  nding. While the share of elderly popu-
lation had a positive relation with per capita expenditure on public education 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the relation was reversed in 1990s when demographic 
change measured by the proportion of the elderly of sixty- ﬁ  ve years or older 
was signiﬁ  cantly accelerated. They conjecture that the result may reﬂ  ect the 
institutional shift in the mid-  1980s, which helped political pressure from 
demographic structure project more clearly into collective decision making 
on public expenditure. From 1985, Japanese central government had gradu-
ally reduced the subsidies to local governments to cover part of teachers’ 
salary and local governments were forced to bear more ﬁ  scal burden with 
regard to compulsory education. One can infer that as the ﬁ  scal burden 
increased the decision making on compulsory education of local govern-
ments, it began to be aﬀected by political pressure from the elderly, who are 
thought to be less supportive for increasing expenditure on public education. 
Plausible as it sounds, the authors do not oﬀer much empirical evidence to 
support the conjecture. Further in-  depth investigation on the issue should 
be done before it is accepted as a reliable explanation on the sign reversal 
repeatedly reported in the chapter.
We should be very careful in interpreting the true implication of estimates 
of the key explanatory variable, the proportion of the elderly among the 
entire population. Though it is not entirely clear from the chapter, it seems 
that the authors include both current and capital expenditure in measur-
ing the dependent variable, per pupil expenditure on compulsory public 
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